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I. INTRODUCTION
[Vol. 1995
The central purpose of the unification of Europe is to create
a regulatory environment in which the principle of free trade in
goods, services, people, and capital is enforced. l This is made
clear in the Treaty of Rome, which established the European
Economic Community in 1957.2 Regulation of the market for
corporate control has attempted not only to harmonize the laws
of the member states, but also, at least ostensibly, to facilitate
hostile takeovers in Europe.3 Thus, for example, the Proposal
for the Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law,
Concerning Take-overs and Other General Bids (the "Proposed
Thirteenth Directive") attempts to facilitate hostile takeovers.4
The reason given for the proposal is "the desire to alter the
European corporate governance environment to encourage a cor-
porate acquisition response to perceived changes in the econom-
ic environment that are believed to have changed the efficient
boundary of the firm."5
A major pro-takeover element of the proposed directive signif-
icantly curtails the ability of target management to respond
defensively after an outside bid has been made. While, for ex-
ample, Delaware state law permits the issuance of special types
1 Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
arts. 2 and 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]'
2 Originally, there were three communities: the European Economic Com-
munity ("EEC"), the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") and the
European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). But in practice, they have
often operated as one organization, and after the Treaty on European Union
and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992,31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty], they
eventually became the European Union ("EU").
3 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on
Harmonizing the European Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 161,
176 (1992).
4 Council Directive No. 90/416, art. 9, 1990 O.J. (C 240) 9 [hereinafter
Proposed Thirteenth Directive].
5 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 176. The EU has a somewhat ambivalent
attitude towards mergers, acquisitions and monopolies. Besides the "corporate
governance" perspective explored in this article, there are also other consider-
ations. For example, the present policy also considers whether takeovers reduce
competition in the EU. A further consideration is whether European corpora-
tions or industrial groups are large enough to be able to compete on a global
seale, an objective that is sometimes only achievable with some reduction of
competition within the EU. The regulatory approach towards takeovers must be
seen from various perspectives.
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of stock by incumbent management in the midst of a takeover
bid in connection with a poison pill takeover defense, such
action is prohibited under Article 8(1)(a) of the Proposed
Thirteenth Directive.6 The proposed directive largely eliminates
the possibility of European companies utilizing a poison pill in
the face of target shareholder-friendly bids because it requires
shareholder approval to issue any securities while a takeover
bid is pending. However, the proposed directive does not pro-
hibit adoption of a poison pill, by shareholder vote, prior to the
receipt of a takeover bid.7 Other defensive tactics (such as issu-
ing dual classes common stock or placing a ceiling on the num-
ber of shares that can be voted by a single shareholder), which
are generally adopted prior to a bid being announced, are simi-
larly regulated. However, the corporate laws of many EO mem-
ber states, as well as other EO directives, do limit pre-bid take-
over defensive measures.s
The Proposed Thirteenth Directive is undergirded by the
proposition that a well-functioning market for corporate control
is considered an important method for monitoring incumbent
management and for improving the allocation of resources with-
in Europe. Takeover bids are common in the United States and
the United Kingdom ("U.K"), which has a relatively long histo-
ry of pro-takeover corporate laws.9 Takeover bids are not so
6 Proposed Thirteenth Directive, art. 8(1)(a) refers to the fourth indent of
art. 2, which prohibits issuance of voting stock "without obtaining the authoriza-
tion of the general meeting of shareholders within the period of acceptance."
This is consistent with most existing company law in the member states and
not an innovation brought forth by the Proposed Thirteenth Directive.
7 "Takeover bid" is defined in articles 2 and 4 of the Proposed Thirteenth
Directive. See generally Proposed Thirteenth Directive, supra note 4. Essential-
ly, any person who acquires one-third of the voting rights in a company is
obliged to make a bid to acquire all the securities of the target company.
6 Council Directive No. 90/629, 1991 O.J. (C 7) 5, Second Amendment to the
Proposal of 20 December 1990 for a Fifth Council Directive [hereinafter Pr0-
posed Fifth Directive] based on Article 54 of the EEC Treaty Concerning the
Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their
Organs. According to the Proposed Fifth Directive, a company would not be
allowed to issue shares with differential voting rights. However, shares with
limited or no voting rights would be limited to 50 percent of the capital, and
special pecuniary advantages must be granted to these shareholders.
9 This pro-takeover orientation is reflected in European merger and acquisi-
tion activity. In 1988, of 3029 successful acquisitions in Europe, 2287 took place
in the U.K alone. 1 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMr.fiJNITY 1
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commonplace on the European continent.10 In fact, because of
more dispersed ownership and legislative restrictions on take-
over defenses, the U.K has been the pioneer in European take-
over law.l1 Because of these varied positions on takeovers, it
is no surprise that the largely U.K-inspired Proposed
Thirteenth Directive has met opposition.12
This article examines the regulation of corporate acquisitions
in Europe from a law and economics perspective. It concludes
that the reform proposals do not meet the stated goal of en-
couraging acquisitions. Rather, the proposed rules will inhibit
acquisitions, which in turn will likely result in less exposure of
incumbent management to market discipline and inefficiencies
in the allocation of productive resources in Europe.
Section II of the article discusses the theoretical underpin-
nings of takeover law, with emphasis on Europe. Section III
describes the principal regulatory and structural obstacles in
the market for corporate control in Europe. Section III also
argues that the European rules concerning takeovers are far
more intrusive than they appear. Section IV examines regula-
tions that should be implemented if Europe is to achieve a
healthy and well-functioning market for corporate control.
(1989) (report commissioned by the U.K Department of Trade and Industry)
[hereinafter 1 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS].
10 [d.
11 The main reason for this is the distribution of share ownership. In most
European countries (excluding the U.K), ownership is concentrated in control-
ling blocks owned by a single shareholder. Bidders cannot acquire the company
without acquiring the controlling block. Most bids start with private transac-
tions in which the controlling block is transferred to the bidder. The takeover is
completed through a "friendly" bid for the remaining shares. The bid for non-
controlling shares is typically mandatory. See Eddy Wymeersch, Takeover Bids
in Europe, in NORDIC PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 234
(Pekka Timnonen ed., 1992); MA WEINBERG, WEINBERG AND BLANK ON TAKE-
OVERS AND MERGERS 1001-13 (5th ed. 1989).
12 The U.K does not want to give up its self-regulatory approach. Germany
and the Netherlands disagree with the restrictions on defensive techniques and
the mandatory bid requirement. In general, the rules are not readily welcomed
in Italy or Spain. See Wymeersch, supra note 11, at 237. The U.K influence in
the Proposed Thirteenth Directive is also apparent by the fact that Professor
Robert Pennington (BirminghanI) prepared the first report on these matters for
the Commission. Accordingly, historical and cultural differences should not be
underestimated when the proposal is analyzed.
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II. A BANK MONITORING SYSTEM VERSUS
A MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
499
A well-functioning market for corporate control serves the
goal of achieving efficient resource allocation by allocating own-
ership and control of assets to those who value them most and
installing the most able managers. These two mechanisms cre-
ate three major sources of gains from takeovers: more efficient
asset combination, more efficient management, and better cor-
porate governance structures.
Changes in competitive pressure can alter the efficient com-
bination of assets. For example, during the 19808 there were
numerous "bust-up" takeovers in which the assets of broadly
diversified corporate conglomerates were split up and sold,
either as stand-alone companies or to companies in similar
lines of business. As Randall Morek has explained, "the source
of bust-up gains in the 1980s is the reversal of the unrelated
diversification of the 1960s and the 19708 and hostile bust-up
takeovers simply undo past conglomeration."13 During the
1960s and 1970s, conglomerate mergers, in which corporations
acquired firms engaged in lines of businesses unrelated to their
own, increased dramatically.14 By 1974, firms that had no sin-
gle, dominant line of business came to represent 20.7 percent of
the firms in the Fortune 500, up from only 7.3 percent in
1959.15
Conceivably, some of these mergers may have been consum-
mated because certain particularly talented managers were able
to take advantage of generic management skills to improve the
productivity of a whole range of businesses, or to improve re-
source allocation within firmS.16 Alternatively, certain conglom-
erate mergers were undoubtedly the result of incumbent mana-
13 Randall Morek et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?,
45 J. FIN. 31, 47 (1990).
14 See DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFr & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 20-55 (1987); MALcOLM S. SALTER & WOLF A. WEINHOLD,
MERGER TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 19808 2-27 (1980).
15 Richard P. Rumelt, Diversification Strategy and Profitability, 3 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 361 (1982) (Table 1).
16 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMs, MARKETs, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 273-97 (1985); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON.
LIT. 1537 (1981).
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gers shielding themselves behind a complex, highly diversified
corporate structure. Whatever the cause, conglomerates were
inviting targets for corporate raiders because unprofitable bran-
ches lowered stock market valuations. Thus, the corporate raid-
ers of the 1980s are perhaps best described as "brokers, rather
than permanent owners, helping to redeploy assets to more
profitable uses.,,17
The hostile acquisition of Revlon by Ronald Perelman in
1985 is an example of how the market for corporate control can
improve the operational efficiency of conglomerates. As one
investment banker described the transaction:
Revlon had acquired a large range of subsidiaries outside its
cosmetics base, including several health care companies.
Perelman soon brought in USD 2 billion by selling off most of
the other businesses, thus enabling him to spend more money on
strengthening the core cosmetics business that had been neglect-
ed.18
Besides improving performance by selling corporate assets to
more specialized managers, takeovers can improve performance
simply by ensuring that corporate assets are managed more
efficiently. Essentially, takeovers serve "to replace ineffective
managers.,,19 This may explain the typical takeover structure
where a less profitable firm is acquired by a more profitable
firm.20
By changing the distribution of ownership and control of
assets, corporate acquisitions generally, and hostile takeovers in
particular, function as a mechanism by which the efficient
boundary of the firm adjusts to changes in the efficient boun-
daries of the industry change resulting from, for example, tech-
nological changes. Government regulation raises the transaction
costs of the equilibration process, thereby petrifying the existing
boundaries of firms and protecting them from the need to res-
pond to a changed economic environment.21
17 Roger E. Alealy, The Golden Age of Junk, THE YORK REvIEw OF BOOKS,




21 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 182.
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This article assumes, and thus does not attempt to prove,
that a well functioning market for corporate control improves
aggregate welfare through efficiency gains. From this assump-
tion, this article makes two claims. First, due to significant
changes in global competition, Europe in the 1990s is in need
of a well-functioning market for corporate control. Second, con-
trary to notions popular among American commentators, com-
mercial banks are not an adequate substitute for the lack of a
market for corporate control. The second point is paramount .
because it pinpoints some of the institutional differences in the
market for corporate control between the U.S. and Europe.
European capital markets, with the notable exception of the
U.K, are underdeveloped, particularly in comparison with U.S.
equity markets. Although European companies need no longer
raise most of their outside capital in the U.S. or Japan or de-
nominate their debt and equity issues in non-European curren-
cies,22 Europe still lags behind in the development of equity
trading. Stock market capitalization is less than twenty percent
of the gross domestic product ("GDP") in France, Germany and
Italy. In the U.K, it is 98.1 percent of GDP and is over 100
percent in the U.S.23 Moreover, the Berle-Means paradigm,
which characterizes the publicly held corporation as having
"concentrated management, and dispersed, diversified stockhold-
ers, shifting control from shareholders to managers," seems
inapplicable to European corporations.24 Extremely high con-
centrations of share ownership in Europe are quite common. In
countries such as Italy, France, Germany and Sweden, such
concentrations of ownership, particularly among related entities
and insiders, make most European companies largely immune
to hostile takeovers, at least in the short run. In other coun-
tries, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, protective mecha-
nisms are deeply embedded in the corporate laws of the respec-
22 Ingo Walter and Roy C. Smith, European Investment Banking: Structure,
Transactions Flow and Regulation., in EUROPEAN BANKING IN THE 19908 115
(Jean Dermine ed., 1993).
23 1 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS, supra note 9, at 10; Market Watch, BARRON's,
Sept. 18, 1995, at 47.
24 Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991).
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tive country.25
Some commentators, most notably Mark Roe, Julian Franks
and Colin Mayer, note that a bank dominated system, such as
that which exists in Germany, and, to a somewhat lesser ex-
tent, in Japan, can serve as a substitute for the market for
corporate control.26 According to this view, large banks exer-
cise the monitoring and management function played by the
market for corporate control. Indeed, Roe strongly suggests that
unfettered market forces would naturally produce a system of
monitoring by strong banks, but that regulation prohibiting the
emergence of large block shareholders in American firms has
forced the evolution of a market for corporate control.27 In
fact, Roe has gone so far as to say that corporate history can
be seen as an effort to find substitutes for the direct monitoring
that politics disallowed.28 Similarly, Franks and Mayer reject
the notion that takeovers are a superior substitute for central-
ized monitoring by banks, arguing that there can be no pre-
sumption that the corporate control market is superior to a
bank-dominated capital market.
We find unappealing the argument that centralized monitor-
ing by banks is a suitable, let alone, superior substitute for the
market for corporate control as a mechanism to achieve alloca-
tiona! efficiency within public firms for three reasons. First,
while the strong bank model fits the reality of Germany, it does
not fit the realities of other European countries such as Italy,
Belgium, Spain or France, which have neither strong bank
systems nor well-functioning markets for corporate control. This
is to say that the strong bank model is the result of unique
historical economic conditions, and not from a modem economic
25 According to Wymeersch, supra note 11, at 235, the Belgian Companies
Act of 18 July 1991 enabled the leading families and interest groups to fumly
secure control in many of the listed companies. Takeover barriers exist to
significantly different degrees in EC countries. See 7 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 22-24 (1989) [hereinafter 7 BARRIERS TO
TAKEOVERS).
26 Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of
Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7, 35 (1990); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer,
Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, Germany and the
UK, 10 ECON. POL'y 189 (Apr. 1990).
'}f/ Roe, supra note 26.
28 Id. at 35.
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imperative.29
Second, these banks typically exercise what is basically a
veto function over proposed projects. Although their monitoring
increases during times of financial crisis, they do not effect the
massive restructurings that were common during the 1980s in
the U.S. In other words, the monitoring and control exercised
by banks is fundamentally different than the monitoring exer-
cised by acquirors. Banks make only incremental changes ex-
cept in times of acute financial crisis.30 Accordingly, banks are
better at maintaining and developing already established firms
through day-to-day supervision than they are at nurturing
emerging firms in new areas of business or at radically restruc-
turing companies due to changes in competitive pressure.
Hence, we claim that banks and potential outside acquirors are
complementary corporate monitors and controllers rather than
substitutes.
Third, and most importantly, it is important to recognize
that banks have a dual economic interest in the firms they
monitor: that of equity holders and of fixed claimants. Unlike
outside acquiror who are solely equity claimants, banks are
often primarily interested in making sure that their outstand-
ing loans are repaid. This is true despite the fact that
European banks may have an equity claim in the firms to
which they loan money because these equity claims are smaller
29 For instance, the U.K does not have a banking system intimately in-
volved in corporate governance, while Germany does. This may be a result of
disparate industrial development in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, which led to significantly different capital and managerial require-
ments. See HANs-HERMANN FRANCKE & MICHAEL HUDSON, BANKING AND FI-
NANCE IN WEST GERMANY 4 (1984); ALExANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC
BACKWARDNESS IN HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1962).
30 The paradigm of the strong bank system in Europe is Germany. How-
ever, contemporary analysis reveals that even large German banks are both
unwilling and incapable of orchestrating significant reorganization of a firm in
financial distress. See JEREMY EDWARDS AND KLAus FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE,
AND INvESTMENT IN GERMANY 160-77 (1994). There are many reasons for this,
but two significant factors are the extremely high level of loan collateralization
(which means banks suffer mjnjmal financial losses in the event of firm col-
lapse) and the general inefficiency of monitoring efforts to detect an impending
financial crisis. See id. In addition, legal obstacles in Germany, such as co-
determination (employee voting rights on supervisory boards), work to prevent
radical financial measures in times of financial crisis and even in times of
success.
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than the fixed claims of the banks. For example, in Germany,
the country with the most commercial bank dominated struc-
ture, banks do not own controlling blocks of equity in German
corporations.31
As fixed claimants, banks do not have the same incentives to
maximize firm value as do equity claimants because they face
different returns from risky but potentially very profitable
transactions. Thus, banks are inferior monitors in comparison
to acquirors who become equity claimants because they have re-
duced incentives to accept high risk, but positive present val-
ue.32 In particular, because of different incentives, monitoring
of a large shareholder in control of the firm differs significantly
from that of a bank with even large fixed claims on the firm.
The differences are exacerbated by the pivotal block holder's
power to transfer control to an outside acquiror.
For these three reasons, we do not believe that a system of
corporate monitoring by commercial banks, even if such a sys-
tem existed throughout Europe, is a substitute for a well-
functioning market for corporate control. By the same token,
the regulatory and structural barriers to takeovers that exist in
Europe are the subject of particular concern.
31 Josef Esser, Bank Power in West Germany Revised, 13 W. EUR. POLY 17
(1990) (noting that by 1986, German banks as a group owned more than 10
percent of the equity in only 86 German corporations, down from 129 in 1976).
In Germany, there is a significant distinction between the shares a commercial
bank owns and the shares it votes. For example, the direct equity holdings of
three commercial banks in Daimler-Benz were: Deutsche Bank (28.2 percent),
Dresdner Bank (1.6 percent), and Commerz Bank (1.6 percent). The number of
shares the banks voted at the annual meeting was: Deutsche Bank (41.8 per-
cent), Dresdner Bank (28.2 percent), and Commerz Bank (12.24 percent). Mark
J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Governance, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1938,
1988 (1993). There are three primary reasons for this disparity between equity
positions and voting power. The first reason is the depositary voting right
whereby German banks vote shares deposited in the bank by shareholders. Sec-
ond, German corporations can and do limit the voting power of single share-
holders, although this limitation does not apply to the aggregation of banks'
direct equity holdings and shares voted through the depositary voting right.
Third, German banks operate mutual funds and vote the shares held by the
mutual funds. See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Gover-
nance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany,
Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
32 See Jonathan R. Macey, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 181-188
(1989).
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III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL IN EUROPE
It is important to distinguish between three different condi-
tions that affect the market for corporate control. These condi-
tions are: (1) the ownership structure of the firm, especially the
allocation of stock between insiders and outsiders; (2) internal
rules of corporate governance; and (3) takeover law and regula-
tion.
A. The Ownership Structure of the Firm
The more concentrated the ownership structure of a particu-
lar firm is, the less likely it will be that a hostile acquisition
can take place. This is because a hostile acquisition, by defini-
tion, is a control mechanism resisted by incumbent manage-
ment. When a single shareholder owns a controlling block of
stock, and presumably supports incumbent management, the
hostile acquisition becomes a negotiation with the owner of the
controlling block, much like the purchase of a private company.
In fact, it is not a hostile acquisition, because the takeover
cannot succeed without the support of the single, controlling
shareholder. Perhaps the only advantage to acquirors from
public companies controlled by a single shareholder over private
companies is access to information about the target firm. This,
however, does not change the fact that where public firms have
intensely concentrated ownership structures, there are no hos-
tile takeovers per se, but merely negotiated acquisitions.
In Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Spain, hostile takeovers are de facto impossible because of the
existence of intensely concentrated patterns of ownership. For
example, in Italy, around five percent of the companies listed
on the Milan Stock Exchange have more than fifty percent of
their common stock in public hands.33 Of this five percent, five
companies are controlled by a holding company owned by a
single family. For this reason, as Professor Ronald Gilson has
observed, "only two companies in the entire Italian economy are
33 2 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 12-14 (1989)
[hereinafter 2 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS].
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even theoretically subject to hostile take-over.,,34 In France,
over half of the 200 largest public and private French compa-
nies are family controlled. Similar conditions exist in Spain.3S
Sweden also has a significantly concentrated ownership struc-
ture.3S An investigation by Coopers & Lybrand, conducted at
the request of the U.K Department of Industry and Trade,
found significant regulatory obstacles to tender offers as an
instrument of structural transformation in all member countries
except the U.K, and, to a lesser extent, France. Coopers &
Lybrand concluded that, outside of France and the U.K, hostile
takeovers in Europe are extremely rare in practice.37
In Germany and Italy, family control of even the largest
corporations is also common and large corporate cross-holdings
make hostile takeovers virtually impossible.3s Moreover, in
Germany, voting rights concentrated with banks further reduce
the probability of hostile acquisitions of German firms.
These concentrations of share ownership make the legal rules
concerning the market for corporate control less relevant. Nev-
ertheless, for at least three reasons, these concentrations of
control do not make the legal rules wholly irrelevant. First,
these extreme ownership concentrations may be only a tempo-
rary phenomenon reflecting the re-emergence of European in-
dustry following the end of World War II:
The pervasiveness of concentrated family ownership, especially
with respect to successful first-generation companies founded
following World War II, reflect a member state's pattern of eco-
34 Gilson, supra note 3, at 182. And, interestingly, one of those companies,
Burgo, was rumored as the target of a hostile takeover bid. 2 BARRIERS TO
TAKEOVERS, supra note 33, at 14.
35 Gilson, supra note 3, at 182.
36 In 1992, the largest shareholder coalition had an average equity fraction
of 47.7 percent ranging from a minimum of 7.1 percent to a maximum of 96
percent and a vote fraction average of 54.6 percent ranging from 7.4 percent to
95 percent (dual-class shares are common in Sweden). Clas Bergstrom et aI.,
Strategic Blocking, Arbitrageurs and the Division of the Takeover Gain: Empiri-
cal Evidence from Sweden, 3 J. MULTINAT'L FIN. MGMT. 217 (1993).
37 7 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS, supra note 25, at 47.
3B Marcus Lutter & Brigitte Lammers, Hostile Takeovers: Possibilities and
Limitations According to German Law, in DEFENSIVE MEAsURES AGAINST Hos-
TILE TAKEOVERS 113 (J.M.M. Maeijer & K. Geens eds., 1990); John Cable,
Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West
German Banks, 95 ECON. J. 118 (1985); Franks & Mayer, supra note 26.
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nomic growth and the life cycle of a particular company. These
conditions will change in response to changes in the economic
environment. As founders of significant numbers of post-war
family companies reach retirement age [sic] concentration of
ownership will dissipate.39
Second, over time, it is likely that disputes, perhaps from
weak performance, will emerge among the families and indus-
trial groups that jointly control many European industrial cor-
porations. Where this happens, shareholders are likely to feel
disaffected and may encourage outside 'bidders. This ~s particu-
larly likely to occur where one group or faction is employed
within the firm while the other groups or factions are not.
Conflicts are prone to arise because insiders are often less con-
cerned about under-performance than they are about continuing
consumption of the perquisites of corporate ownership and con-
trol, while outsiders are more concerned with the dividends and
capital appreciation that follow superior performance.
Finally, it is possible that concentrated ownership can actual-
ly facilitate, rather than impede, the market for corporate con-
trol due to the simple fact that the transaction costs of effect-
uating a change in control will be less where an acquiror can
assemble a control block by making a small nwnber of strategic
purchases from large block holders instead of making a public
tender offer to all existing shareholders.
Thus, because of concentrated share ownership, a future
European market for corporate control may not be characterized
by the highly public tender offers that characterized the
American takeover wave of the 1980s. Rather, negotiated block
acquisitions will necessarily characterize the market for corpo-
rate control in Europe.40
B. Firms' Internal Rules of Corporate Governance
Another large impediment to the emergence of a well-
functioning market for corporate control is the set of internal
39 Gilson, supra note 3, at 183.
40 See Bergstrom et al., supra note 36 (reports 212 successful takeover bids
out of 252 in Sweden between 1980 and 1992. Most bids were friendly and
negotiated transfers of controL Less than 10% of the public tender offer bids
were hostile).
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governance rules by which many corporations often create near-
ly insurmountable obstacles to hostile acquisitions. For example,
share voting restrictions in the form of dual class voting stock
and ceilings on the number of shares that can be voted by a
single shareholder present significant burdens on the European
market for corporate control. Like the issues concerning the
basic ownership structures of the firm, these burdens are not
addressed by European Union directives concerning takeovers.
However, unlike the possibly inefficient ownership structures
described earlier, the inefficiencies contained in these internal
rules of corporate governance may not be self-correcting.
Having multiple classes of stock with disparate voting rights
(dual class voting stock) is common in several European coun-
tries, most notably Sweden.41 A company with dual class vot-
ing stock issues low-vote-power or non-voting stock to the public
while management or a dominant shareholder group retains
effective control of the company through the retention of a class
of stock with superior voting rights.42 Even though a majority
of the capital in a firm with dual class voting stock may have
been raised from outside investors, the disparate voting rights
can make outside takeovers of such firms impossible.
Capped voting arrangements can similarly retard takeovers.
Under such arrangements, common in Germany,43 the voting
power of individual shareholders is capped at a certain level,
regardless of how many shares are owned.
Both of these arrangements deprive outside investors of the
ability to transfer control to others who value the control
41 In the U.K, there is no statutory prohibition against voting right differ-
entiation, but the stock exchange prevents listed companies from introducing::
dual class shares. Portugal and Switzerland impose no regulation, while the"
Nordic countries, with the exception of Norway, limit dual class voting rights.
Dual class shares are prohibited in several countries, e.g., Belgium, Germany
and Italy. See EuROPEAN CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO M&A AND
CORPORATE REsTRUCTURING LEGISLATION (1990) [hereinafter EuROPEAN CORPO-
RATE FINANCE LAW]. This publication contains many details on the legislative
environment in Europe relating to mergers, acquisitions and restructurings.
42 Kenneth Lehn et al., Consolidating Corporate Control: Dual-Class Recapi-
talizations Versus Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 557 (1990).
43 See Franks & Mayer, supra note 26.
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more.44 However, the Proposed Fifth Directive concerning the
structure of limited liability companies was amended to prohibit
capped voting as well as dual class voting.45 Thus, in the un-
likely event that the Proposed Thirteenth Directive, which is
applicable to most firm acquisitions, were amended to conform
to the Proposed Fifth Directive, both dual class voting arrange-
ments and capped voting would be impermissible.46
Both of these types of defensive arrangements prevent the
emergence of an effective market for corporate control. Professor
Gilson has attempted to distinguish these two defensive devices
by arguing that dual class voting arrangements are more be-
nign than capped voting. He argues that dual class voting is a
more desirable corporate governance device because control is
retained by an owner/decision maker, while capped voting
schemes operate to assure that nQ owner also controls.47 This
basis for a distinction is unpersuasive in the context of the
market for corporate control. Both of these arrangements oper-
ate generally to concentrate ownership in the hands of incum-
bent management, and to prevent hostile takeovers. However, a
more relevant distinction is that under a capped voting scheme
it may be impossible to effectuate even a voluntary transfer of
control. Thus, the ability of firms to limit the maximum num-
ber of shares a single shareholder can vote represents a signi-
ficant potential burden on the European market for corporate
control.
C. Takeover Regulation at the European Level
In addition to the concentrated ownership structure of firms
in Europe and the restrictive European rules of corporate gover-
nance, the legislative framework regulating takeovers in Europe
hobbles the development of a well-functioning market for corpo-
rate control in Europe. Of pivotal importance is the Proposed
44 Interestingly, a pair of proposed rules would have prohibited dual class
voting arrangements while authorizing capped voting. Article 52(3) of the Pr0-
posed Statute for a European Community, E.C. Bull. supp. May, 1989.
45 Proposed Fifth Directive, supra note 8.
45 The latest draft of the Proposed Thirteenth Directive is from 1990. See
Proposed Thirteenth Directive, supra note 4. Due largely to its politically con-
troversial nature, it is still in draft form.
47 Gilson, supra note 3, at 186.
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Thirteenth Directive which "constitutes the principal effort at
harmonizing European takeover law.n48 In particular, a market
for corporate control is considered to be an important instru-
ment to monitor and raise the efficiency of resource allocation
in a changing economic environment. The improving allocative
efficiency by enabling larger efficient scales of enterprise is the
primary objective of the Proposed Thirteenth Directive.49
To meet this objective, the Proposed Thirteenth Directive
appears to facilitate development of an efficiency-promoting
market for corporate control by prohibiting management from
taking defensive action after a hostile bid has been made. As
Professor Gilson has presciently observed:
[T]he British governance model places the power to transfer
control of a corporation with its shareholders much more effec-
tively than currently is the case in the United States. Under
General Principle 7 of the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers,
target companies are essentially prohibited from taking defensive
action once a bid is made. As a result, target management's
decision not to participate in a friendly acquisition can be ap-
pealed to the shareholders by means of a hostile bid. The British
model is clearly reflected in Article 8 of the Thirteenth Directive,
which, in the words of the explanatory memorandum accompany-
ing the directive, "require[s] the board of the offer company to
refrain from adopting defensive measures without the authorizing
of the general meeting of shareholders.n50
A conclusion that defensive measures should be prohibited is
too simplistic. The matter is complicated because defensive
measures also increase a target company's ability to negotiate a
higher premium. The appropriate level of defensive measures is
thus a matter of effecting a balance between the probability of
receiving an offer, which decreases with the extent of defense,
and the expected bid premium, which increases with the extent
of defense. Stronger defensive measures promote the interests
of the owners if the positive effect of a higher bid premium
dominates the negative effect of the reduced possibility that
48 [d.
49 [d. at 177.
50 [d.
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someone will make a bid.51
However, because there is no reason to believe that the capi-
tal markets would be incapable of assessing the advantages and
disadvantages of various defensive measures, there should be
no reason to limit the power of companies to adopt takeover de-
fenses. A prohibition against easily assessed defensive mea-
sures, such as poison pills, crown jewel lock-ups or high sever-
ance bonuses for target company management, may instead
lead the target to adopt more costly and hard-to-assess mea-
sures that cannot easily be priced. One example is a defensive
acquisition that increases the size of the potential target and
thus makes it more difficult to acquire. Consequently, measures
adopted to eljmjnate some impediments to takeovers may actu-
ally encourage the use of worse impediments.
In addition to the goal of allocative efficiency, the Proposed
Thirteenth Directive has a second objective: to protect small
minority shareholders in takeovers. To achieve this, the
Proposed Thirteenth Directive contains three general principles:
(1) equal bid requirements; (2) mandatory bid requirements;
and (3) equal access to information.52
The equal bid principle forces a potential acquiror to extend
the same tender offer price to all share owners; price discrimi-
nation between large controlling block owners and small stock-
holders is prohibited.53 The mandatory bid rule gives any
shareholder the right to sell if a new controlling position is
established where none existed before or a pre-existing control-
ling stake is transferred. This principle is implemented by re-
quiring any share owner who has attained at least one-third of
61 See Andrei Sbleifer & Robert W. Visbny, Greenmail, White Knights, and
Shareholder Interest, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293 (1986).
62 The inspiration behind and the archetype for this legislative activity is
the voluntary code of conduct, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, admin-
istered by a non-statutory body (the Panel). See City Code, supra note 50. With
a few important exceptions, the Proposed Thirteenth Directive almost emulates
the rules in the City Code.
63 See Proposed Thirteenth Directive, art. 62(2), supra note 4. This principle
is supplemented with special rules governing certain situations. For example, if
there are different classes of shares (dual class structure), the typical European
legal system permits tender offers that price discriminate between the classes.
In the United States, similar principles were the basis for legislation directed at
cash tender offers. See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-{e), 78n(d)-{f) (1988».
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the target's voting rights to extend an offer to all shareholders
for the remaining shares of the company.54
The third principle concerns equal access to information. The
Directive stipulates that target shareholders have a right to
detailed information from the acquiror in connection with a
tender offer.55 Moreover, in order to enable the shareholders to
evaluate the bid, it must be open for a specified minimum time
period.56 The European Community has adopted an additional
Directive which requires publication of certain information
when a major block of stock in a listed company is acquired or
sold.57
Although the Proposed Thirteenth Directive is intended to
have fundamental, comprehensive and far-reaching effects,
there is a conspicuous lack of a law and economics analysis of
these effects. This Article attempts to rectify this by discussing
the economic consequences of the three principles, as well as
the conflicts between allocative and distributive objectives.
1. The Equal Bid Principle
The equal bid principle has, like the other parts designed to
meet the distributive objectives of the Proposed Thirteenth
Directive, the goal of equality and fairness of treatment - a
goal that springs from the general socio-political canon of equal
treatment. The equal bid principle assumes that positive take-
over gain is not realized unless the bidder owns all of the tar-
get's equity.58 Therefore, the mandatory bid rule is moot be-
54 Proposed Thirteenth Directive, art. 4(1), supra note 4.
55 Id., preface at 8, art. 10.
66 Article 12(1) specifies that the period for bid acceptance may be no less
than four weeks and no more than ten weeks from the date the offering docu-
ment is made public. Id.
57 Council Directive 88/627, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62.
58 There are at least three general reasons why ownership of all target
shares is more beneficial than just operational control: (1) if full ownership is
established, operations can be restructured without objection from minority
shareholders; (2) with a controlling interest of less than 100 percent of the
shares, taxes must be paid separately on both firms' profits whereas with full
ownership, profits and losses can be transferred between the firms in order to
minimize the total sum of tax payments; and (3) finally, if the acquiror intends
to invest heavily in the firm, but does not expect the minority shareholders to
invest a proportionate amount, he may prefer full ownership.
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cause the rational bidder seeks to own 100 percent of the tar-
get.
The equal bid principle is a prohibition on price discrimina-
tion between holders of large and small controlling blocks. It is
designed to prevent takeovers in which a control premium is
paid to controlling shareholders while small shareholders re-
ceive less due to their lesser bargaining power. However, some
important threshold issues remain unanswered. Do legal rules
that enact an equal division of gains from corporate control
transactions maximize investor wealth? Does the equal bid
principle truly raise firm value and minority shareholder
wealth? Is the equal bid principle an appropriate policy instru-
ment in the face of the dynamic transformations of corporate
structures in Europe?
A proper analysis of the economic consequences of the equal
bid principle must distinguish the ex ante and ex post effects of
the rule, and assess the effects on various categories of share-
holders. The temporal distinction is essential because the value
of pre-existing firms contains an ex ante component that reflects
the expected value of future takeovers: the discounted value of
a takeover adjusted for the likelihood of its occurrence. An
economic analysis of proposed rules is essential because it looks
at how the value of a firm is affected by different legal rules
while legislative initiatives often are motivated by and strictly
consider ex post effects such as the distribution of an acquisi-
tion gain. Comprehensive economic analysis must integrate the
effect of a rule change on the likelihood of the takeover with
the distributive effects of a successful takeover.
It is necessary to differentiate between the effects on large,
pivotal block holders and small shareholders because the rule
presumes this ownership differentiation. In particular, the prin-
ciple prohibits the sale of control blocks at a premium over the
shares acquired from smaller stockholders.59 It is essential to
remember that an European takeover scenario probably in-
cludes large pivotal shareholders who have the capacity to
negotiate better terms than the small shareholders. The block-
ing power of the large shareholders requires that a bidder must
reach an agreement with these pivotal players.
The potential for strategic blocking by large shareholders in
69 Proposed Thirteenth Directive, art. 62(2), supra note 4.
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takeover attempts manifests itself under various target owner-
ship structures and circumstances. The simplest case is that of
a stockholder who controls a majority of the target's equity.
But, even if a party controls less than fifty percent of the equi-
ty, a bidder may be forced to negotiate with this powerful mi-
nority because the alternative takeover strategy, acquiring the
shares from many small stockholders, may impose prohibitively
high transaction costs.
Furthermore, when the fraction of shares needed to accom-
plish a takeover is large, the likelihood of successfully blocking
the takeover increases. When a buyer opts to bid for 100 per-
cent of a target's shares, the compulsory acquisition limit rule
opens a window for larger shareholders to block the bid and
simultaneously eliminates this opportunity for smaller stock-
holders.60 If a threshold percentage of the equity is tendered,
generally ninety percent, the bidder has the option to compel
the sale of the remaining shares at the same price at which the
first shares were acquired. The motivation behind this rule is
to facilitate takeovers by preventing small groups of stockhold-
ers from determining the success of a takeover. The structure of
the rule gives blocking power to those who own enough stock to
prevent triggering the compulsory acquisition limit rule. For
instance, holders of ten-plus percent of stock in Swedish or
U.K corporations are necessary participants to ensure a bid's
success. This forces a bidder to reach an agreement with the
block holder concerning the acquisition share price.61
Although the equal bid requirement may at first seem innoc-
uous and even fair, it is demonstrably unfair to minority share-
holders except under a limited set of conditions.62 Ideally, the
60 The Proposed Thirteenth Directive does not include a Compulsory Acqui-
sition Rule (CAR). Other EU countries have implemented a CAR. Because the
Proposed Thirteenth Directive does not address this issue, each country in the
EU is free to adopt its own CAR variant. Most have not. See 1 BARRIERS TO
TAKEOVERS, supra note 9, at 29.
61 Interestingly, because of the concentrated ownership structure that char-
acterizes publicly listed corporations in continental Europe and Scandinavia, the
Compulsory Acquisition Limit may force an acquiror to face more than one large
incumbent shareholder with blocking capability.
62 For a formal analysis of the equal bid principle, see Clas Bergstrl>m &
Peter Hogfeldt, The Equal Treatment Principle: An Analysis of The Thirteenth
Council Takeover Directive of the European Community, Stockholm School of
Economics (1994).
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equal bid principle shifts part of the acquisition gains from the
purchasing company and large block shareholders to the tar-
get's small shareholders. However, if the number of successful
acquisitions is reduced by the requirement, net gains for small
shareholders may be reduced. The equal bid requirement will
decrease the likelihood of acquisitions because discriminatory
bids priced to favor controlling shareholders can make acqui-
sitions less costly and thus more common.
In sum, policymakers must recognize the two countervailing
effects of the equal bid principle. The guarantee that small
shareholders will receive the same price offered to any share-
holder, including insiders, will raise the average price offered to
small shareholders. Simultaneously, smaller net gains result
from the reduction in the number of offers. Determining which
effect is dominant is an empirical question beyond the scope of
this paper. Nevertheless, in light of the significant controlling
blocks held by insiders in Europe and the likelihood of signifi-
cant private benefits to owners of such blocks, it is reasonable
to conclude that the equal bid principle will harm small share-
holders by significantly lowering the probability of negotiated
acquisitions. The ominous conclusion is that the effect of the
equal bid principle is directly opposed to the objective of pro-
tecting the economic interests of target company shareholders.
Equally troublesome is the reduction in takeover offers follow-
ing the implementation of the equal bid principle - a result
contrary to the goal of improved resource allocation through
facilitation of corporate acquisitions. In fact, the disincentives
faced by a potential bidder are so large that enactment of the
equal bid principle demonstrably lowers the expected allocative
and synergy gains accruing from takeovers.63 The equal bid
principle not only creates a conflict between stated allocative
and distributive goals, but also works consistently against the
allocative objectives.54
63 Id.
64 In fact, one might ask whether the very starting point, namely special
protection of the small shareholders of target firms is correct. Equity holders, in
general, want to rnaxiInize the value of their portfolio which consists of shares
both in the prospective target companies and in acquiror companies, and not
just the value of a particular stock. Equal bid rules transfer wealth from acquir-
ors to targets; a portfolio holding stocks of both firms shows no net gain from
the implementation of equal bid rules and the portfolio owner is, therefore,
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2. The Mandatory Bid Rule
A similar critical analysis applies with respect to the second
instrument designed to achieve the distIibutive goal of the
Proposed Thirteenth Directive: the mandatory bid rule. Any
bidder trying to acquire control of a target corporation, where
the intended acquisition added to existing direct or indirect
holdings exceeds a certain percentage of the voting rights -
Article 4(1) stipulates one-third of the voting rights - must
extend an offer to purchase all the target's shares. Thus, an
acquiror cannot acquire a controlling stake without making a
bid for the remaining shares.65 France, Italy and Norway have
recently enacted similar mandatory bid rules with only slight
variations in the percentage of equity necessary to trip the
mandatory bid requirement.66
The general motivation behind the mandatory bid rule is to
protect investors from two-tier bids. According to Farrar et al.,
the mandatory bid rule in the City Code is derived from the
notion that it seems wrong to compel shareholders to become
minority shareholders in a company without giving them the
option to sell their shares and that it is wrong to compel mi-
nority shareholders under an original controlling shareholder to
become a minority to a new controlling shareholder. Therefore,
universal bids are deemed necessary to protect investors.67
indifferent to their presence or absence. Even an undiversified shareholder,
interested solely in rules which transfer the profits to the target company if an
offer materializes, is indifferent because he does not know whether his company
will be an acquiring or a target company.
Furthermore, since takeover bids often come at significant premia over the
pre-exiBting share prices of target firms, and because arbitrageurs and other
investors often purchase in anticipation of such a bid being announced, it is
likely, as the probability of a takeover goes up, that the value of all shares in
the company will increase. Hence, the very foundation of the equal bid principle
- the presumption of significantly different gains between large and small
shareholders from takeovers - may be less convincing than at first blush.
65 One difference between the City Code and the Proposed Thirteenth Direc-
tive is that the trigger limit for actual control is thirty percent of the equity in
the former but one-third in the latter. 7 BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS, supra note
25, at app. Dl.
66 EUROPEAN CORPORATE FINANCE LAw, supra note 41, at 139-40, 245, 294.
fiT This was one important reason why the French legislation was changed
in May 1992. During the takeover by Pinault of Le Printemps, investors pro-
tested, and in some cases even sued in court, in order to have bids for all of
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This suggests that the mandatory bid rule gives a costless
option to target shareholders exercisable when there is a
change of control. A rule that gives all shareholders such an
option initially seems like a fair and innocuous measure that
protects minority interests. However, that is not necessarily the
effective result of the mandatory bid rule.68
The optimal acquisition is to acquire only the minimum num-
ber of shares in the target firm necessary to obtain control.69
This is because the price required to induce marginal share-
holders to tender in a partial bid is lower than that needed to
induce all shareholders.70 The costs of a partial bid are lower
in comparison to a full bid for additional reasons. By making
an offer for only the smallest percentage of share~ necessary to
obtain control, outside bidders can reduce the likelihood of
their shares. Interestingly enough, Belgian law considers a mandatory bid rule
to be a veiled protective device due to the fact that the 100 percent bid require-
ment increases the bidder's financial burdens as he has to offer to buy all
shares to acquire controL Wymeersch, supra note 11, at 239.
68 For an extensive formal analysis of the mandatory bid rule, see
Bergstrom & Hogfeldt, supra note 62.
69 It should be noted that according to the City Code partial offers are
possible under some circumstances. The Code requires an offer which would
result in the acquiring company holding thirty percent or more of the voting
rights to be approved by shareholders holding over fifty percent of the voting
rights not held by the acquiror and persons acting in concert with it. This
requirement may on occasion be waived if over fifty percent of the voting rights
in the target company are held by a single shareholder. WEINBERG, supra note
11, at 'lI 2-023. Even though this option might seem difficult to use, it should be
noted that this is a perceivable softening of the Panel's traditional approach,
and, perhaps, the suspicion of partial offers will be even less in the future.
WEINBERG, supra note 11, at 'lI 2-022.
10 There are several reasons for such an upward sloping supply curve. Rene
Stulz argues that such a curve may reflect that shareholders have different
marginal tax rates. Rene M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Finan-
cial Policies and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1988).
Simon claims that even with identical marginal tax rates, the supply curve can
be upward sloping since shareholders have acquired their shares at different
prices. Moreover, shareholders are rarely 11Danimous concerning the ability of
the bidder. Certain outside shareholders are likely to disbelieve the ability of
the outside acquiror to increase the value of the target firm, and thus will be
willing to tender. Others hold more optimistic beliefs and therefore try to free
ride.
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holdout problems.71 Hence, the mandatory bid rule may sub-
stantially increase the acquiring costs for potential bidders and
thereby discourage takeover attempts.72
Moreover, the increased costs in the form of higher interest
expense and greater exposure to risk can make it unprofitable
for a bidder who has already identified improvements in effi-
ciency to acquire control, to replace management and to change
the physical plants and procedures. A mandatory bid rule can
also prevent acquisition of a substantial position in a firm in
order to learn more about the firm and its development poten-
tial before deciding to actually seek control.
In summary, the enactment of a mandatory bid rule may
result in fewer productivity-increasing acquisitions. It is no
coincidence that managers at several U.S. corporations have
proposed the introduction of the mandatory bid rule into their
companies' articles of incorporation - the rule is seen as a
defense against hostile takeovers.73 A genet'al enactment of the
rule within the EU would reduce the number of efficiency in-
11 For a discussion of the holdout problem, see Sanford J. Grossman &
Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the
Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980).
72 This assertion is true in a general sense, but its magnitude may vary
depending on particular circumstances. In the case of firms controlled by large
block shareholders, the mandatory bid rule will almost certainly reduce the
number of takeovers because it will effectively eliminate the private, negotiated
transfer of control by requiring that the terms of any agreement reached with
controlling owners be extended to all shareholders. In the case of widely-held
firms, of which there are remarkably few in continental Europe, the mandatory
bid rule will have, at worst, an ambiguous effect on the aggregate number of
takeovers. In fact, the mandatory bid rule may even make takeover bids of
widely-held firms more frequent, because the fixed costs of a takeover bid
(researching the target firm, various regulatory filings, and publicity) will
decline on a per-share basis as the number of shares in the bid increases,
allowing for a higher per-share bid price (assuming, of course, no difficulty in
amassing the capital necessary to make the 100 percent bid).
73 The second wave of takeover statutes in tlJ,e United States includes
redemption rights that give shareholders cash redemption right against any
buyer of at least 30 percent of the firms stock. Only three states adopted the
redemption rights provision. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The
Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J, FIN. ECON.
291, 299 (1989). For an interesting empirical analysis, see John Pound, On the
Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate
Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 656
(1992).
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creasing takeovers and reduce the welfare of shareholders. That
is, the rule would be inconsistent with the two objectives of the
Proposed Thirteenth Directive.
3. The Principle of Equal Access to Information
In addition to the two general principles of equal and man-
datory bids, the EO Directives contain a third set of rules gov-
erning disclosure of substantial share acquisition,74 requiring
detailed offer documentation75 and mandating a minimum bid
acceptance period.76 Like the mandatory bid rule and the
equal bid principle, these obligations are designed to ensure
that target company shareholders are protected from abuse by
parties with information advantages.
a. Rules Governing Disclosure of Substantial
Acquisitions of Shares
When a party buys a large block of shares in a company, its
objective may be to create more favorable conditions for a sub-
sequent tender offer. According to the EO Directive on
Disclosure Requirements, existing shareholders in the target
company, as well as others who trade in its shares, should have
an opportunity to protect their interests.77 The Directive stipu-
lates publication of certain information when a major holding in
a listed company is acquired or otherwise transferred. If a per-
son (legal or natural) acquires or disposes shares of a listed
company and if, following that transaction, the proportion of vo-
ting rights exceeds or falls below a certain threshold, the per-
son must notify the company and the relevant authorities.
These rules make the identification of takeover candidates,
perhaps those which could benefit from improvements in effi-
ciency, more costly. This is because the disclosure requirements
increase the costs to a potential bidder purchasing a significant
fraction of the stock in order to more closely evaluate the po-
tential target. In addition, the disclosure rules exacerbate the
74 Council Directive 881627, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62.
75 Proposed Thirteenth Directive, art. 10, supra note 4.
76 Id., art. 12.
77 Council Directive 88/627, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62.
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problem identified by Grossman and Hart, namely that share-
holders will only sell if the offeror pays at least what the
shareholders believe the shares will be worth after a takeover
and consequent firm restructuring.78 If an acquiror bids at a
lower price than the perceived post-acquisition value, minority
shareholders will not sell ex ante so they can take advantage of
the ex post share price increase caused by the new firm man-
agement. Thus, to purchase from rational shareholders, an
acquiror must pay a premium nearly equal to the amount of
the expected improvement in the value of the firm. This leaves
the acquiror with no profit. Because the improvements in effi-
ciency which follow acquisition are public goods (no shareholder
can be excluded), bidders have an incentive to understate the
magnitude of intended improvements. In order to make future
"understatements" credible, successful bidders also have an
incentive to limit the scope of actual reform as well.
Mandatory disclosure rules make the benefits of acquisition
perceived by both acquirors and target shareholders congruent.
Empirical evidence from the United States indicates that target
shareholders can quantify potential gains simply by possessing
information about the identity of the potential acquiror.79 One
way of overcoming the collective action problem identified by
Grossman and Hart is to permit acquirors to accumulate large
blocks of stock in target companies in secret - that is, acquisi-
tion without disclosure to target shareholders. The European
rules move in the opposite direction by mandating disclosure;
this reduces aggregate shareholder welfare because the proba-
bility of a bid is reduced.
b. Obligation to Provide Information before a Tender
Offer and Minimum Tender Period
The Proposed Thirteenth Directive requires that bidders
provide target shareholders with detailed information about the
offer.80 Moreover, in order to provide target share-holders suf-
ficient time to evaluate a bid, the Proposed Thirteenth Directive
78 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Cost.~ and Benefits of Owner-
ship: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
79 Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation l3D and the
Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 131 (1987).
so Proposed Thirteenth Directive, art. 10, supra note 4.
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mandates a mjnimum bid acceptance period.s1 The idea under-
lying these disclosure obligations is to safeguard target share-
holders from "low-ball" offers made by bidders with information
advantages.
Requiring the provision of detailed offer documentation and a
period of acceptance generates drawbacks similar to those gov-
erning the disclosure of substantial acquisitions. The require-
ments give the target company's shareholders information and
time to arrive at a decision but simultaneously give potential
rivals free information about the target company, as well as
time to investigate and act on this information. Because the
costs of discovering under-valued targets and launching a bid
for control are high, these disclosure rules provide a significant
disincentive to acquire information because of the likelihood of
free-riding by competitors.S2
The disclosure requirements impair the private economic
value of the information, and thereby the incentives to produce
it. Stringent information requirements therefore imply that
fewer players in the market will search for inefficiently run
companies, seek more efficient production plans or identify
potential synergistic gains. This is analogous to patent law
where patent protection is a necessary condition for high invest-
ment in research and development.
Empirical analysis of U.S. data shows that bid premia rose
and bidder returns declined significantly after the disclosure
rules of the Williams Act were introduced in the United
States.83 Competition for the target company quite simply
pushed premia up.
This analysis of the rules requiring equal and mandatory
81 This period is a minimum of four weeks beginning with the public an-
nouncement of the bid. Id., art. 12.
82 A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose that an initial bidder
has investigated $1,000,000 in search costs to discover that a target company
with 1,000,000 shares outstanding is undervalued by $50 per share. The initial
bidder could bid no more than $49 per share for the target, because such a bid,
when combined with the $1,000,000 in search costs, would eliminate all positive
returns to the bidder. But a second bidder, free riding on the first bidder's sunk
costs in search, could bid up to the full $50 per share. Knowing this, of course,
the initial bidder would decline to incur the sunk search costs in the first place.
83 See, e.g., Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acqui-
sitions, and their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring
Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 31 (1988).
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bids and equal access to information show that, .because the
rules are likely to reduce the number of takeovers (and conse-
quent synergy gains), the distributive and allocative goals of
the Proposed Thirteenth Directive are not met and are actually
hampered.
IV. THE POLICY MAKER'S DILEMMA AND THE NEED
FOR PRIvATE ORDERING
Up to this point our analysis has emphasized the benefits of
a well-functioning market for corporate control. In particular,
the need to restructure the rigid ownership and organization
structures of the post-World War II period in light of the rapid-
ly evolving global economy suggests a large role for the market
for corporate control in Europe. The post-war productive envi-
ronment is characterized as one in which "a small number of
long-lived standardized products employing a production process
designed to maximize scale economies is giving way to one in
which the market demands a vastly larger array of specialized
products, that have dramatically shorter product cycles and
whose manufacture demands a different kind of production
process and industrial organization."84 The flexible production
requirements of the 1990s require new corporate and capital
configurations.
The mandatory bid rule, the equal bid principle and the
rules requiring equal access to information are conspicuous
because they increase the power of entrenched blocks to thwart
attempts at hostile acquisitions. These rules threaten to make
it more difficult for Europe to break. away from the concentrat-
ed, interlocking corporate ownership structures that deprive its
manufacturing firms of the flexibility they need to adapt to new
market conditions.55 Although these rules may be relatively
well suited for corporate control'markets characterized by wide-
ly dispersed, atomistic shareholders unable to fend for them-
84 Gilson, supra note 3, at 175.
85 For a discussion of the relatively inflexible corporate governance scheme
in Germany, see Friedrich Kilbler, Institutional Investors and Corporate Gover-
nance: A Gennan Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL INvEsTORS AND CORPORATE
GoVERNANCE 565 (Theodor Baums et al. eds., 1994). This work also contains
several examinations of structural impediments to efficient corporate control in
Europe.
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selves in the face of a hostile takeover threat, they are unsuit-
ed for a market characterized by highly concentrated share
ownership.
Note that this article does not argue that defensive tactics in
general are never desirable. In fact, such tactics can be highly
useful and welfare enhancing. For example, outside investors
may only be able to persuade managers to make costly, firm-
specific human capital investments necessary to achieve opera-
tional improvements if they can erect defensive barriers suffi-
cient to ensure that the value of these human capital invest-
ments will not be appropriated by outside bidders. Similarly, it
may be the case that as share ownership becomes more widely
dispersed, the dangers of strategic behavior by bidders will
come to outweigh the dangers of strategic behavior by target
management or large block holders. Where this is the case, it
may be in the interest of particular firms to operate in a regu-
latory environment characterized by some or all of the defensive
protections discussed here.
The primary point is that the defensive devices being man-
dated for European companies could be adopted privately by
individual firms, as part of their corporate charters or articles
of incorporation. It is peculiar and perverse to mandate these
rules for all firms when they are appropriate for only a small
subset of European corporations. This is particularly true in
light of the fact that, to the extent management controls the
corporate proxy machinery and has interests divorced from
shareholders, their natural proclivities will be to opt for levels
of takeover protection that are too high, rather than too low,
from the perspective of outside equity holders. The proposed
rules restrict the adoption of defensive measures when rules
dissuading the adoption of such measures are actually needed.
Put differently, it is clear that the policymakers' dilemma
applies with full force to the rules discussed here.86 No single
comprehensive regulation like the mandatory bid rule or the
equal bid principle will be optimal for all firms. Consequently,
the interests of shareholders are better served if regulators do
not interfere in the choice of bidding strategy, but rather allow
shareholders to choose for themselves the defensive strategy
86 See Jonathan R. Macey, Takeover Defense Tactics and Legal Scholarship:
Market Forces Versus the Policymakers Dilemma, 96 YALE L.J. 342 (1986).
HeinOnline -- 1995 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 524 1995
524 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1995
that is best for them. In its quest for unified rules, the
European Community has ignored this classic dilemma of regu-
lation.
Thus, just as requiring mandatory or equal bids is unhelpful,
so too is the elimination of dual class voting stock or capped
voting. Even though these voting structures are sub-optimal for
many firms, they are optimal for other firms.
V. CONCLUSION
The overall aim of the Proposed Thirteenth Directive is to
create more effective corporate structures in Europe and to
protect the interests of small shareholders. Our analysis illus-
trates the potential conflict between these two allocative and
distributional objectives. Under the Proposed Thirteenth
Directive, European takeover regulation will produce too few
takeovers. These regulations impose significant structural barri-
ers ~ the efficient redeployment of corporate assets. To the
extent that any regulation in this area is justified, such regula-
tion should stimulate acquisitions, because firms have private
incentives to erect takeover barriers.
Our overall conclusion is that implementation of the equal
bid principle and the mandatory bid rule as well as the set of
rules governing equal access to information impedes changes in
European industrial structure. Thus, the Proposed Thirteenth
Directive is contrary to the declared purpose of transforming
European corporate structures. Furthermore, in effect, the
Proposed Thirteenth Directive is diametrically opposed to the
explicit goal of protecting shareholder interests - particularly
those of smaller shareholders. Accordingly, the objectives and
the measures to achieve them are not properly aligned. As a
policy package the proposed Thirteenth Directive is inconsis-
tent. Regulatory reform, even if enacted with the best of inten-
tions, is not an inherent guarantee of better outcomes.
